Fighting Tyranny with Tyranny
The Effect of the Korean War on US-Spanish Relations
The Korean War had numerous “ripple effects” on international events that
at first do not seem intuitive. One of the many changes in international
relations brought about by the Korean War was the diplomatic resuscitation
of Spain. Because they supported the Axis during the Second World War,
Spain became internationally isolated after the end of the war. The
Korean War acted as a catalyst to end Spain’s isolation. Primarily as
a result of the Korean War Spain went from being an international pariah state
to an ally of the American Empire in its fight against the Soviet Empire.
In the wake of Napoleon’s invasion of Spain and then being driven out, Spain
lost most of its empire and underwent a series of revolutions and counter-revolutions
influenced by the ideas of the French revolution. Proponents of republicanism
and free market capitalism clashed with defenders of the Monarchy and the
old semi-feudal aristocratic system. In the start of the 20th century
Spain was ruled by a Monarchy. That Monarchy fell in 1931 and a republic
came to rule Spain. In 1936 General Franco launched a civil war between
fascists and a coalitions of leftists which destroyed the Republic and, with
Franco’s victory in 1939, brought Spanish fascism to power with Franco at
it’s head. At the start of the civil war a brief anarcho-syndicalist revolution
was launched, but crushed by the Republicans and Communists.
During the Second World War Spain remained within the axis camp and provided
assistance to the axis war effort. Spain never joined the war, however,
due to repeated failures to negotiate a deal with Hitler. After the
defeat of the Axis powers Spain stood alone and isolated from the rest of
the world. Since Spain never got around to joining the war the allies
did not invade it but because it was on the losing side of the war it was
hated by the victorious powers.
Spain was excluded from the UN, NATO, Marshall Plan and several other international
efforts. In 1946 the UN passed a resolution condemning Spain and calling
on all member countries to cut off diplomatic contact with Spain and withdraw
their ambassadors. Most countries did this. Those that did not
were mostly fellow rightist dictatorial regimes – including the semi-fascist
state in Argentina, several Middle Eastern Monarchies and the military dictatorship
in neighboring Portugal. Portugal, which was a NATO member at the time,
actively advocated Spain’s inclusion in the international community but had
little success until the 1950s.
This isolation began to end as the cold war started. The Berlin blockade,
Chinese revolution and Soviet test detonation of nuclear weapons all confirmed
the increasingly clear division of the world into a bipolar order. Spain
took advantage of the deteriorating relations between the two superpowers
to push for Spanish integration into the Western camp.
The US began to pay more attention to the potential military benefits of
working with Spain. The Join Chiefs of Staff commissioned a study, “Drumbeat,”
which concluded in August 1947 that from a military point of view it would
be in the United States best interests to furnish Spain with economic aid
and to have friendlier relations. Shortly afterwards the Policy Planning
Staff, based on military considerations, decided that it would be best to
modify the US stance towards Spain.
Spain had several potential military benefits for the United States.
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles had not yet been invented in 1950 so to
bomb Warsaw Pact nations the US needed air bases within range of enemy territory.
Bombers stationed in Spain could deliver both conventional and nuclear bombs
to the USSR & its European puppet states but was far enough from the
border that the Red Army could not reach the bases without going through
much of NATO territory. In addition, naval bases in Spain would allow
the US military to control the Mediterranean Sea.
All this represented at most “a normalization of relations between the two
countries and they might not have gone on to form a special tie but for the
outbreak of the Korean War.” [1] In early 1950 NSC 72 analyzed the US
position towards Spain and recommended that the US change its policies towards
Spain so as to improve US military capabilities in Europe. The proposal
to do this went nowhere. President Truman was both anti-fascist and
anti-communist and was opposed to the whole idea of allying with a fascist
state. He called the report “decidedly militaristic and in my opinion
not realistic with present conditions.” [2] It was the start of the
Korean War that changed this.
On July 31, not long after the Korean War had started, the Secretary of
Defense sent a memorandum to the President reminding him that
"with reference to the provision of military aid to Spain under the Mutual
Defense Assistance Act … the President is now authorized to transfer military
assistance … to any other European nation not now specified in the Act.
… [therefore] you are authorized to transfer military aid to Spain in an
amount not to exceed 10% of the aggregate of the funds and contract authority
made available under each of the three titles of the Act." [3]
Almost immediately after the Korean War broke out Senator Pat McCarran proposed
an amendment to the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 that would authorize
100 million dollars of loans to Spain. This proposal was approved by
a vote of 65 to 15 on August 1st, 1950. On April 27 of the same year
a similar proposal by Senator McCarran to loan Spain 50 million was defeated
by 42 to 35. He was able to pass the loan for twice the amount four
months later because of the start of the Korean War in late June. One
supporter of the bill, Senator Walter F. George, made the link between the
Korean War and changing relations with Spain clear:
"Tragic as this war is – and it is tragic beyond description – it still
will serve us and the other free people of the world well in the future,
if it has the effect of returning America to a sense of realism." [4]
Of course, for Senator George, “a sense of realism” included working with
fascists to defeat Moscow. The House later reduced the amount to 62.5
million and President Truman signed the bill on September 6th, 1950.
For the first time since the Spanish Civil war the Export-Import Bank earmarked
funds for Spain.
Senator Joseph McCarthy was strongly in favor of an alliance with Spain,
claiming, “there is no war on God’s earth to defend the richest prize for
which Communist Russia is aiming – the industrial heart of Europe – unless
we use those two great wells of tough anti-Communist manpower, Western Germany
and Spain.” [5] In a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State
for European Affairs to the Secretary of State the link between the Korean
War and changing policy towards Fascist Spain was against made clear:
"Changing conditions resulting from Soviet-inspired aggression and the consequent
danger of global war, require a reconsideration of US policy toward Spain
which will serve the immediate requirements of our national security. … our
immediate objective should be to develop the military potentialities of Spain’s
strategic geographic position for the common defense, all such action to be
guided by the political considerations set forth in NSC 72/1. When plans
for the use of Spain for the common defense of Western Europe and the Mediterranean
and North Atlantic areas have been completed we should approach the Spanish
government in order to acquire such facilities as air and naval bases." [6]
On November 4th, 1950 the UN passed a resolution repealing part of the earlier
1946 resolution condemning Spain. The resolution resolved:
"1. To revoke the recommendation for the withdrawal of
Ambassadors and Ministers from Madrid, contained in the General Assembly resolution
of December 12, 1946.
2. To revoke the recommendation intended to debar Spain
from membership in international agencies established by or brought into relationship
with the United Nations, which recommendation is a part of the same resolution
adopted by the General Assembly in 1946 concerning relations of Members of
the United Nations with Spain." [7]
A year later Spain was admitted to the Food and Agricultural Organization.
The warming relations towards Spain caused by the Korean War made it possible
for those who had been advocating a military alliance with Spain to push forward
their agenda. In 1952 negotiations between the United States and Spain
for a treaty started. France and England objected to the idea of bringing
Spain into the fold, but their objections were eventually overcame; though
they did prevent Spain’s entry into NATO for several decades.
The negotiations went through three main phases. In the first phase
each side familiarized themselves with what the other wanted and began preliminary
negotiations. The US wanted to obtain several air force bases in Spain,
strategically located to be capable of striking the Soviet Empire but out
of the reach of the Red Army. The US also wanted naval bases and to
establish the headquarters of the sixth fleet in one. The sixth fleet
was assigned to the Mediterranean, a strategically important location.
Spain wanted military and economic aid to help their economy recover and “wanted
to be assured that, in case of war, sufficient forces together with the necessary
equipment were under Spanish command to guarantee the defense of the country
against an invading force.” [8] This meant that the US would have to
either build up Spain’s defenses into a state of the art army (a very expensive
option) or sign a bilateral treaty similar to NATO that would guarantee US
defense of Spain in the event of war. US negotiators opted for the
later. They seemed to be near reaching an agreement in late 1952 but
Franco suddenly withdrew all concessions, hoping to get a better deal by
holding out.
The second phase of negotiations lasted from December 1952 to mid-1953.
During this period negotiations went nowhere. The transfer of power
from Truman to Eisenhower temporarily disrupted the negotiations in early
1952. Each side employed diplomatic bluffs and counter-bluffs, trying
to gain the upper hand in negotiations.
This ended in June 1953 when both sides decided to try and find an acceptable
compromise, starting the third and final phase of negotiations. The
US agreed to defend Spain from any invasion and Spain agreed to provide bases
for the US. The US would have to first get permission from Spain before
using the bases to fight other countries except in the case of a Soviet sneak
attack, in which case the US could use them at will. This later provision
was made secret so as to avoid domestic criticism in both countries.
Franco’s regime was based on nationalist ideology and making it secret would
avoid the impression that Spain was being subordinated to the US and the US,
which was based on democratic ideology, wanted to avoid criticism of backing
fascism.
President Eisenhower completed the deal by signing the Pact of Madrid on
September 26, 1953, just two months after the end of the Korean War.
Officially the pact was not a treaty but an “executive order.” This
was in effect the same as a treaty, except the President didn’t have to get
the Senate’s approval of it – effectively subverting part of the constitution.
In exchange for the bases Spain received 600 million dollars in military aid
and 500 million in economic aid. Commenting on the Pact, Eisenhower
said:
"It is a quid pro quo; they had certain things that we need and are valuable
to us, and we made certain arrangements in order to get those things.
I might say that this thing has been in the mill for a long time … and we
believe it is something that will work to the benefit of the United States."
[9]
Even more important then the money Spain gained was Spain’s readmittance
into the international community. Spain would soon be admitted to the
United Nations and many other international organizations. Eventually
it would join NATO. This was the start of Spain’s journey out of isolation
and into the western camp, eventually becoming a normal west European country.
Notes
[1] Whitaker, p. 37
[2] Pollack, p. 1562
[3] Pollack, p. 1572-3
[4] Congressional Record, 1950
[5] McCarthy, p. 49
[6] Pollack, p. 1577 - 1579
[7] Rubottom, p. 93
[8] Leitz, p. 272
[9] Reid, p. 622
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